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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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18 June 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 June 1964

### DAILY BRIEF

Turkey: Parliamentary maneuvering may limit Prime Minister Inonu's freedom to negotiate over the Cyprus issue during his visit to the US next week.

The opposition Justice Party and the minor parties have decided to withhold support from Inonu in a confidence vote scheduled for 19 June. Inonu's Republican People's Party does not have enough strength by itself to win the vote against concerted action by the opposition.

A majority--226--of the whole membership of the National Assembly, however, rather than simply a majority of those present and voting, is required to oust the government. The inclination of many deputies to abstain, coupled with weak party discipline, especially in the minor parties, is thus likely to preserve the government.

The attitudes of the parties indicate that even if Inonu receives a vote of confidence he probably would face great difficulty in getting Parliament to approve any concessions he might make toward a Cyprus settlement.

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Congo: President Kasavubu has indicated that he intends to retain Adoula as premier to govern until national elections are held.


According to the Belgian ambassador in Leopoldville, Kasavubu has said that other candidates had little to offer and that Adoula is the only "legal contender." He said Adoula's government would be essentially unchanged. The President also said he was thinking of holding a round-table conference of all Congolese leaders, including Tshombé and Gizenga, sometime before the elections, which are tentatively scheduled for early next year.

Kasavubu, if he has in fact made up his mind, seems to be discounting the pressures for a change of government which have mounted as a result of the deteriorating security situation. Even were this situation to improve, Adoula would probably continue to face strong opposition unless he brings at least some of his opponents into the cabinet.

[Tshombé, who is capable of posing a serious threat to the central government's authority in Katanga, is reported to have flown to Burundi on 15 June to meet anti-Adoula elements. The former Katangan leader is apparently trying to bring together all major Congolese elements opposing the government.]

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18 June 64 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

Burma: There appears to be growing dissatisfaction with the Ne Win regime, which has bungled its economic program and has failed to curb ethnic insurgency.

Serious shortages of staple food items have developed, primarily because of the rapid nationalization of the retail distribution system. In addition, the savings of many Burmese have been wiped out as a result of currency mismanagement.

The prominence of former Communists within the governmental apparatus has led to a sense of desperation and to increased talk of armed resistance among antiregime elements. There has been, however, no recent evidence of concrete plots against the regime.

Insurgency has continued to grow throughout Burma's ethnic minority areas. In the Kachin State, the insurgent Kachin Independence Army is now operating freely in groups of up to 500 men. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Shan insurgents have established themselves in such force in the southern section of the Shan State--an area previously thought secure--that the Burmese Army has been compelled to use tanks to move through the area. 71

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18 June 64

DAILY BRIEF

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South Vietnam: The Viet Cong are again intensifying military pressure on the government.

Viet Cong activity has risen sharply since the first week of June. On 17 June, the Viet Cong mounted an estimated battalion-sized attack against Duc Hoa, a district capital in Hau Nghia Province just west of Saigon. This attack is the first major Viet Cong military action against a district capital since mid-April.

There have been ten other significant Viet Cong attacks since 8 June. Most have been made in company strength. The majority have occurred in the coastal plains of the north and in the delta area around Saigon.

A total of 615 incidents of all kinds have been reported for the second week in June. This is one third more than the previous week, and is the highest number for any week since early March. Of these, 57 were armed attacks, more than double the previous week and the largest number of such attacks since mid-April.

As the monsoon season further curtails the mobility of government forces, particularly air and road movements, the Viet Cong will probably become increasingly aggressive.

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18 June 64

DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

Venezuela: The student strike at the Central University in Caracas, now in its second week, remains completely effective. So far, the strike has been peaceful. The Communists, however, have threatened violence against any who might attempt to attend classes. Student leaders and university authorities are under pressure to reach a compromise settlement, but the US Embassy doubts that the strike can be ended without one side or the other suffering a "real defeat."

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Angola: The Angolan rebels are continuing to lose ground,

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One area of rebel activity has been evacuated, and the number of rebel units operating inside Angola has declined. Such reverses will heighten the bickering among Angolan leaders, and will increase pressure on Holden Roberto to accept military aid from the Chinese Communists.

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